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CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 
 
Danielle Olson 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As businesses are increasingly taking operations overseas, international criminal law and 
its implementation in domestic and international jurisdictions will become progressively more 
relevant to companies and its decision makers.  For many companies, going global has meant 
adopting network-based operating models involving multiple corporate entities that spread across 
and within countries.1  Consequentially, a variety of corporations from all sectors have a global 
presence in countries where crimes against humanity and other gross human rights abuses occur. 
The business transactions of these companies and their relationships with state governments, 
armed groups, and other businesses require them to understand what conduct may constitute a 
crime under international criminal law.  Without a sound understanding of international criminal 
law, companies may fall vulnerable to corporate complicity in gross human rights violations, 
thus availing themselves to criminal liability under international law.  
In recent years, questions concerning the human rights responsibilities of business have 
increased, particularly with respect to harms committed in countries where transnational 
corporations (“TNCs”) have substantial investments or from which they source goods.2  TNCs 
increasingly have been recognized as having the potential to impact a wide array of human rights 
in a variety of industry sectors including: extractive industries, pharmaceutical and chemicals, 
defense, utility and infrastructure, food and beverages, and Information Technology hardware 
and telecommunications.3  
Due to their expansive network, the world’s largest transnational corporations command 
substantial economic power.  As of 2009, there were 82,000 TNCs worldwide, with 810,000 
foreign affiliates.5  Exports by foreign affiliates of TNCs were estimated to account for about a 
third of total world exports of good and services.  In 2008, The number of people employed by 
these TNCs worldwide totalled about 77 million, amounting to more than double the labor force 
of Germany.  In 2001, 500 of the world’s largest TNCs had annual sales larger than the GNP of 
100 countries and Wal-Mart alone had annual sales higher than the GNP of all 40 countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa.6  With great power comes great responsibility.  And in the context of 
multinational business, with great responsibility comes a great risk of criminal liability for 
violating human rights.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 John Ruggie, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (2013). 
2 Henkin, Cleveland, Helfer, Neuman, Orentlicher, HUMAN RIGHTS SECOND EDITION, Foundation Press 890 (2009). 
3 Adapted from Rory Sullivan, NGO Influence on the Human Rights Performance of Companies, 24 NETH. Q. HUM. 
RTS. 407 (2006). 
5 United Nations, World Investment Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and 
Development, xxi. 
6 Debra Johnson & Colin Turner, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS THEMES AND ISSUES IN THE MODERN GLOBAL ECONOMY 
12 (2003). 
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  In a report from the International Commission of Jurists Expert Legal Panel on Corporate 
Complicity in International Crimes, the experts described the wide range of circumstances under 
which corporations’ liability for complicity in human rights abuses has been scrutinized: 
 
The international community has been shocked at reports from all 
continents that companies have knowingly assisted governments, 
armed rebel groups or others to commit gross human rights abuses. 
Oil and mining companies that seek concessions and security have 
been accused of giving money, weapons, vehicles and air support 
that government military force or rebel groups use to attack, kill 
and “disappear” civilians. Private air service operators have 
reportedly been an essential part of government programs of 
extraordinary and illegal renditions of terrorist suspects across 
frontiers. Private security companies have been accused of 
colluding with government security agencies to inflict torture in 
detention centers they jointly operate. Companies have reportedly 
given information that has enabled a government to detain and 
torture trade unionists or other perceived political opponents.  
Companies have allegedly sold both tailor-made computer 
equipment that enables a government to track and discriminate 
against minorities, and earth-moving equipment used to demolish 
houses in violation of international law. Others are accused of 
propping up rebel groups that commit gross human rights abuses, 
by buying conflict diamonds, while some have allegedly 
encouraged child labor and sweatshop conditions by demanding 
that suppliers deliver goods at even cheaper prices.7 
 
Although these abuses are not new, what has changed is the renewed insistence by 
victims and their representatives for accountability when companies are involved in gross human 
rights abuses.8 The strategy to protect human rights has shifted from nearly exclusive attention 
on the abuses committed by governments to close scrutiny of business enterprise activities, in 
particular, those of multinational and transnational corporations.9  The movement towards greater 
corporate social responsibility is now entering a phase in which the parameters of this field are 
being defined.10  As human rights instruments on the topic develop, the list of corporate 
responsibilities that businesses are expected to adopt in the field of human rights continues to 
grow.  
This paper examines the main legal elements of corporate criminal responsibility for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 International Commission of Jurists, CORPORATE COMPLICITY AND LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY, Report of the 
International Commission of Jurists Expert Legal Panel on Corporate complicity in International Crimes, available 
at http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Vol.2-Corporate-legal-accountability-thematic-
report-2008.pdf at 58. 
8 Id. 
9 Steven R. Ratner, CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A THEORY OF LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY, 111 Yale L.J. 443, 
446-48 (2001). 
10 Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, CATEGORIES OF CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, 24 
Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 339 (February 26, 2008). 
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involvement in serious human rights violations, focusing specifically on the mens rea, or mental 
element requirement of a crime. It analyzes in detail what it means for a business to be complicit, 
the degree of knowledge corporations and their officials must have to be implicated in 
accomplice liability, and a case study demonstrating the consequences of such liability on 
corporations. 
 
I.  CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR BUSINESS COMPLICITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
 
A. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE COMPLICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES? 
 
There are many situations in which businesses and their officials are the direct and 
immediate perpetrators of human rights abuses.  However, businesses can also implicate 
themselves in gross human rights violations by working with another actor responsible for the 
direct perpetration of human rights abuses.11  Human rights organizations, activists, international 
policy makers, government experts, and businesses themselves, now continuously use the phrase 
“business complicity in human rights abuses” to describe what they view as unacceptable 
business involvement in such circumstances.12  
 Previous cases demonstrating how businesses can become implicated in gross human 
rights abuses fall into four categories: (i) businesses and their managers are accused of being the 
main perpetrators; (ii) businesses supply equipment or technology in the context of a commercial 
trading relationship that is then used abusively or repressively; (iii) businesses are accused of 
providing information, or logistical or financial assistance, to human rights abusers that has 
“caused” or “facilitated” or exacerbated the abuse; and (iv) businesses are accused of being 
“complicit” in human rights abuses by virtue of having made investments in projects, joint 
ventures, or regimes that have poor human rights records or connections to known abusers.13    
 
  B.  HISTORY OF JURISDICTION FOR CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
 Current notions of corporate responsibility for facilitating human rights abuses are 
backed by legal theories whose origins can be traced back to the trials that followed the Second 
World War.14  The first formal reaction toward corporate responsibility originated from criminal 
law when German industrialists who collaborated with the Nazi regime were held responsible for 
their financial and material support in violation of the customary international law proscribing 
genocide.  Among the civilians who were tried for assisting in carrying out the genocide 
committed by the Nazi regime 15  was Bruno Tesch, who was found to have contributed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 International Commission of Jurists, CORPORATE COMPLICITY AND LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY, Report of the 
International Commission of Jurists Expert Legal Panel on Corporate complicity in International Crimes, available 
at http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Vol.1-Corporate-legal-accountability-thematic-
report-2008.pdf, 3. 
12 Id.  
13 Dr. Jennifer Zerk, TOWARDS A FAIRER AND MORE EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF DOMESTIC LAW REMEDIES, A report 
prepared for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 8. 
14 Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky and Veerle Opgenhaffen, THE PAST AND PRESENT OF CORPORATE COMPLICITY: 
FINANCING THE ARGENTINEAN DICTATORSHIP, 23 Harvard Human Rights Journal 160 (2010). 
15 See Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon, An Examination of Forced Labor 
Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91 at xx (2002). 
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commercially by providing the lethal gas used in the Auschwitz concentration camp. 16 
Additionally, Friedrich Flick was found to have contributed financially by profiting from slave 
labor in the camps and then donating a portion of the profits to the Schutzstaffel (“S.S.”). 
command to help sustain its activities.17  The British Military Tribunal found that although the 
criminal character of the S.S. was not well known when Flick started attending fundraising 
dinners in the 1930s, his contributions and attendance continued long after the criminal character 
of the S.S. was generally known.18   
In United States v. Goering, the Nuremberg Tribunal found that: 
Those who execute the plan do not avoid responsibility by showing 
that they acted under the direction of the man who conceived it . . .  
He had to have the cooperation of statesmen, military leaders, 
diplomats and businessmen. When they, with knowledge of his 
aims, gave him their cooperation, they made themselves parties to 
the plan he had initiated. They are not to be deemed innocent . . . if 
they knew what they were doing.19 
 These so-called “industrial cases,” tried in both the Nuremberg and United Kingdom 
tribunals, have been a cornerstone for cases holding individuals who are complicit in human 
rights abuses responsible.20  
 
C. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Traditionally, criminal justice systems could not hold a business criminally accountable 
as a legal entity.21  Rather, criminal law pursued and attributed guilt only to individuals for 
criminal activity.22  The Nuremberg Charter did give the International Military Tribunal the 
power to declare groups or organizations consisting of the knowing and voluntary members as 
criminal.23  However, the Tribunal could only do so at the trial of an individual or natural person, 
and in some cases only included those above a certain rank as part of such group.24  On the other 
hand, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), and the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) Statutes 
all provide jurisdiction only over natural persons.25  Although there was a proposal to add legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), 1 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS 
OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93, 93 (1947) (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946). 
17 Id. 
18 Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability Volume 1: Facing the Facts and Charting a Legal Path 21 Report 
of the International Commission of Jurist Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes 
(2008). 
19 United States v. Goering (The Nuremberg Trial) 6 F.R.D. 69, 112 (Int’l Mil. Trib. 1946). 
20 Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky and Veerle Opgenhaffen, THE PAST AND PRESENT OF CORPORATE COMPLICITY: 
FINANCING THE ARGENTINIAN DICTATORSHIP, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 23 at 160.  
21 Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability Vol. 2, supra note 7 at 56. 
22 Id.  
23 Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 315 (2008). 
24 Id., see also Nuremberg Charter, Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of 
the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Charter II, art. 9, entered into force Aug. 
8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.  
25 Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability Vol. 2, supra note 7 at 56. 
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entities, including corporations, to the jurisdiction of the ICC during the negotiations of the 
Court’s Statute, it failed.26  As a result, the ICC still lacks jurisdiction over corporations, and, 
instead, only has jurisdiction over natural persons, such as individual company representatives 
and employees.27  So far, no international criminal tribunal has acquired jurisdiction to try a 
company as a legal entity for crimes under international law.28  
Although corporations cannot be prosecuted before international criminal tribunals, their 
legal risk of violating criminal international law is still of relevant concern.  Businesses, 
including those in the United States, still face the risk of violating criminal international law that 
has been implemented and enforced under their national judicial system.29  As national criminal 
laws develop to include this type of liability, so do the arguments for an expansion of 
international courts’ jurisdiction over company entities.  In the majority of the jurisdictions that 
already recognize the potential criminal responsibility of companies, companies can be held 
responsible for both national crimes and crimes under international law.30  In the countries where 
crimes covered by the ICC have been incorporated into the national legislation, companies may 
be exposed to criminal responsibility in domestic courts for crimes enshrined in the Rome 
Statute.31 
Even though corporations themselves cannot be brought under the jurisdiction of 
international criminal courts, individuals within these corporations can still be prosecuted in their 
individual capacity before international criminal tribunals.32  Under the Statutes of the ICC and 
the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, a person can be responsible for committing, 
planning, ordering, or instigating a crime or for otherwise aiding and abetting a crime.33  
Company officials who are involved in committing crimes under international law are 
susceptible to the increased risks of being investigated, prosecuted, and punished in a wide range 
of jurisdictions.34  Although this may not result in legal consequences to the corporation itself, 
the involvement of corporate leaders in human rights abuses cases can damage a company’s 
reputation and cash flow.  A genuine consideration of what it means to be complicit in human 
rights violations and a change in company policy to prevent criminal liability can save 
corporations money, time, and the risk of negative publicity.  Companies should be aware that 
even if their company cannot yet be brought under the jurisdiction of international criminal 
courts, the actions taken by their personnel no matter where they operate are subject to the limits 
set by international criminal law.  
 
II. RISK OF LIABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 Under both international and domestic criminal laws, those involved in the commission 
of a crime can be held responsible either as principal perpetrators or as accomplices, depending 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability Vol. 2, supra note 7 at 56. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 57 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 11 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 57 
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on their acts in the commission of a crime.35  Labeling a perpetrator as an accomplice, and not a 
principle in the commission of a crime, does not necessarily diminish their legal liability under 
international law.36 The main focus of the international criminal courts and tribunals since 
Nuremberg has not been the perpetrators on the ground, such as the executioners, torturers, and 
rapists, but those who conceived, led, controlled, or facilitated their acts, whose responsibility 
may be even greater than that of a principal perpetrator who directly or physically committed the 
crime.37 
Although there have been significant developments in clarifying the standards of liability 
for companies under criminal international law, there still remains some confusion in the courts 
as to the proper test for determining the mens rea element needed to link a corporation to a 
human rights abuse.  This section will discuss the difference between the knowledge test and the 
purpose test and argue that going forward, courts should adopt a unified knowledge test to 
provide predictability for businesses in the future.  
 
A.  ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Since Nuremberg, the international community has accepted that accomplices, or those 
who aid and abet crimes, are responsible under international criminal law.38  The Nuremberg 
Charter imposed individual responsibility on “accomplices participating in the formulation or 
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit” a crime enumerated within the Charter.39  
The International Law Commission (“ILC”) of the United Nations in 1950 articulated 
Nuremberg Principle VII as follows: “Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a 
war crime, or a crime against humanity . . . is a crime under international law.”40  
The concept of accomplice liability is also a feature of international or criminal tribunals 
and is incorporated into the statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the 
Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.41  Specifically, the 
ICTY and ICTR statutes impose individual criminal responsibility on any person who “aided and 
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution” of genocide, war crimes or crimes against 
humanity.42  
Similarly, the ILC’s 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind proposes to impose criminal responsibility for genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes (as well as other crimes) on an individual who “knowingly aids, abets or otherwise 
assists, directly and substantially, in the commission of such a crime, including providing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability Vol. 2, supra note 7 at 11. 
36 Id. at 12. 
37 Id. 
38 See Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 307 (2008). 
39 Nuremberg Charter, AGREEMENT FOR THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS OF 
THE EUROPEAN AXIS, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Charter II, art. 6, entered into force Aug. 8, 
1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. 
40 PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RECOGNIZED IN THE CHARTER OF THE NURNBERG TRIBUNAL AND IN THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, 377, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER.A/1950/Add. 1. 
41 Article 7(1) ICTY Statute: Article 6(1) ICTR Statute: Article 6(1) SCSL Statute; Article 29 Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers with inclusion of amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004, 
Article 3 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
42 ICTY Statute, art. 7.1; ICTR Statute, art. 6.1. 
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means for its commission.” 43   The ICTY deemed the ILC Draft Code an “authoritative 
international instrument.”44 
Finally, in 1998, the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court imposed criminal 
responsibility on one who “aids, abets or otherwise assists” in the commission of genocide, war 
crimes or crimes against humanity.45 
 
B.  THE MENS REA ELEMENT OF AIDING AND ABETTING: THE KNOWLEDGE TEST AND THE 
PURPOSE TEST 
 
 Although it is generally accepted that accomplices are responsible under international 
criminal law, there still remains great controversy in international law regarding the degree to 
which one must prove that an accomplice had knowledge that its actions would facilitate the 
perpetration of a crime (the “knowledge test”) and whether it is necessary to prove the intent of 
that person or entity to facilitate the crime (the “purpose test).46 
Aiding and abetting has two elements of the crime: the conduct of the person who aids 
and abets (actus reus) and the person’s mental state (mens rea).47  There is little controversy in 
international criminal law that the actus reus, as summarized by the widely cited ICTY Trial 
Chamber Judgment in the Furundzija case consists of rendering “practical assistance, 
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the 
crime.”48  The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) expert legal panel described the actus reus 
element as satisfied if the company’s conduct had “enabled,” “exacerbated,” or “facilitated” the 
abuses.49  Furthermore, if a company facilicated a gross human rights violation by enabling, 
exacerbating, or facilitating human rights abuses, the company or its officials would enter a zone 
in which they could be held criminally liable as an aider or abettor of a crime or as a participant 
in a common criminal plan, or under the law of civil remedies for intentionally or negligently 
causing harm to a victim.50  
The more disputed issue is whether the aider and abettor need merely have knowledge 
that their actions will facilitate the commission of a crime, or whether they must harbor a 
purpose to facilitate the crime.51  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n., ch. 2, arts. 
2(3)(d), 17, 18, 20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l (Part. 2), 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_4_1996.pdf. 
44 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ¶ 227 (Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in 
38 I.L.M. 317, ¶ 227 (1999). 
45 ICC Statute, art. 25.3(c), infra note 35, (quoted in full infra note 36). 
46 See Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 304 (2008) 
47 Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 191, 236. 
48 Id. ¶ 235.  
49 Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability Volume 1: Facing the Facts and Charting a Legal Path 21 Report 
of the International Commission of Jurist Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes 
(2008). 
50 Id. 
51 See Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 304 (2008) 
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The Knowledge Test 
 
Several immediate post-World War II cases used a knowledge standard.52  For example, 
in the Zyklon B case, the prosecutors before the British Military Tribunal convicted the two top 
officials of the firm that supplied Zyklon B to the Nazi gas chambers as accessories to war 
crimes.53  The British military court did not attempt to prove that the accused acted with the 
intention, or purpose, of assisting the killing of the internees.54  It was accepted that their purpose 
was to sell insecticide to the S.S. for profit, a lawful goal pursued by lawful means.55  Instead, the 
charge accepted by the court was that the two top officials knew what the buyer intended to do 
with the product that they were supplying.56	   
Additionally, in the Einsatzgruppen case, the American military court also used a 
knowledge test, in contrast to the aforementioned purpose test, to convict defendant Fendler; the 
court determined that the defendant knew that executions were taking place.57  Furthermore, the 
ICTY Trial Chamber in Furundzija adopted a knowledge test: “[T]he mens rea required is the 
knowledge that these acts assist in the commission of the offence.”58  The ILC code also adopted 
the knowledge test.  Under the ILC code, a person can only be found guilty of aiding and 
abetting, or otherwise assisting if they know that their help will facilitate a crime.59  The ILC 
Code is consistent with the subsequent findings of the Appeals Chamber of the ad hoc 
tribunals.60   
Accordingly, the mens rea of aiding and abetting is knowledge that the acts performed by 
an individual assist the commission of the specific crime by the principal perpetrator.61  Under 
this code, the aider and abettor need not share the mens rea element of the principal; but instead, 
must be aware of the essential elements of the crime that was ultimately committed by the 
principal.62  Therefore, in crimes of specific intent, such as genocide, the aider and abettor must 
know of the principal perpetrator’s specific intent.63  In the case of genocide, the aider and 
abettors must know that the people whom they are helping intend to destroy a particular national, 
ethnic, religious or ethnic group.64   
Under the knowledge test, a company representative who knows that the equipment the 
business is selling is likely to be used by a buyer for a crime would not escape liability because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations at 308. 
53 Id. at 304 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id.  
57 Trial of Otto Ohlendorf and Others (Einsatzgruppen), 4 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nurenberg Military 
Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 572 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1997) (1949) quoted in Furundzija, 
Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 218. 
58 Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 249. 
59 ILC Yearbook 1996, p. 18: Article 2(3)(d) ILC Draft Code, p. 21 ¶ 11.  
60 Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability Vol. 2, supra note 7 at 21. 
61 ICTY, Blagojevik and Jokic, (Appeals Chamber) 29 July 2004, ¶¶ 45-46; ICTY, Vasiljevic, (Appeals Chamber) 25 
February 2004, para. 102. 
62 Corporate COmplicty and Legal Accountability at 21. 
63 ICTY, Simic, (Appeals Chamber) 28 Nov. 2006, ¶ 86; ICTY, Blagojevic and Jokic (Appeals Chamber) 9 May 
2007, ¶ 127; ICTR, Ntagerura, (Appeals Chamber) 7 July 2006, ¶ 370. 
64 ICTY, Krstic, (Appeals Chamber) 24 March 2000, ¶ 162; ICTY, Kmojelac, (Appeals Chamber) 17 Sept. 2003, ¶ 
52. 
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there is uncertainty as to the exact crime intended.65  If they have the necessary knowledge as to 
the impact of their actions, it is irrelevant that they only intended to carry out normal business 
activities.66  For example, vendors who sell goods or materials such as chemicals, computers, 
bulldozers, or digging equipment can be responsible as accomplices if they have knowledge, 
judged through an objective standard, that the purchaser would use them to commit crimes under 
international law.67 
Some courts, however, have rejected the knowledge test, and instead have applied a 
higher mens rea standard which states that an individual will be guilty if they aid, abet, or 
otherwise assist in the commission, or it attempted commission, of an act “for the purpose of 
facilitating” the commission of a crime.68 
 
 The Purpose Test 
 
A few months before the ICTY Trial Chamber in Furundzija adopted a knowledge 
test for aiding and abetting, the Rome Statute of the ICC adopted a purpose test.69  Article 
25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute makes one who, “[f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission of 
such a crime, aids, abets, or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, 
including providing the means for its commission . . .” criminally responsible.70  This phrase 
introduced a mental element that went beyond the ordinary mens rea requirement of intent and 
knowledge required for other crimes under the Rome Statute and from the knowledge test 
described above.  
The drafting history shows that the purpose test was not adopted until the Rome 
Conference.71  Several prior drafts of the Rome Statute, including the final draft submitted to the 
Preparatory Committee to those negotiating the Statute in 1998, bracketed the language of what 
ultimately became article 25(3)(c).72  The bracketed language, due to disagreement among the 
drafters, would have imposed responsibility on one who “[with [intent][knowledge] to facilitate 
the commission of such a crime,] aids, abets or otherwise assists in the commission . . .”73  The 
disagreement was settled in the final negotiating conference, in which the knowledge and intent 
requirements were replaced with the “purpose” standard.74 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability, supra note 7 at 21. 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 22 
69 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference on Plenipotentiaries on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998, entered into force, July 1, 2002, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 21, art. 25.3(c), 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC 
Statute]. 
70 ICC Statute, art. 25.3(c) 
71 See Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 310 (2008) 
72 Id.  
73 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: An Article-by-Article Evolution 
of the Statute 194 (2005), (1998 Preparatory Committee Draft art. 23.7(d)); see id. at 197 (Zutphen Draft art. 
17.7(d)); see id. at 198 (Decisions Taken By Prepatory Committee In Its Session Held 11 to 21 February 1997, 
article B(d)); see also id. at 203 
74 See Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 310 (2008) 
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M. Cherif Bassiouni, former professor of law at DePaul University College of Law, 
chaired the drafting committee at the conference, explained that the decision was not taken by his 
committee, but by the Working Group on the General Principles of Criminal Law,75 chaired by 
Per Saland, Director of the Department for International Law and Human Rights of the Swedish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 76  Professor Bassiouni believed the dispute had to do with 
differences between civil law and common law lawyers and different understandings of 
language.77  If so, the interpretation in the end seems to have come out the same in both English 
and French: a “purpose” test.78 
Another perspective on the purpose tests comes from Professor Dr. Kai Ambos, a leading 
scholar who was a member of the German delegation at the Rome Conference.79  Dr. Ambos 
explained that the “purpose” test was borrowed from the Model Penal Code of the American 
Law Institute.80  In the Model Penal Code, a person acts “purposely” if he or she has a 
“conscious object” to cause a given result.81  Originally adopted in 1962, the Model Code 
specifies a purpose test for aiding and abetting, as follows: 
Section 2.06. Liability for Conduct of Another; Complicity. . . . 
(3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an 
offense if: 
(a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the 
offense, he . . . 
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or 
committing it . . . .82 
The similarity between the language of the Model Penal Code 2.06(3)(a) (“purpose of 
promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense”), and the ICC Statute Article 25(3)(c) 
(“purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime”) support this explanation.83 
 
C.   CLARIFYING CONFUSION IN THE COURTS 
 
Due to the differing approaches of the mens rea standard under the ICC Statute and other 
tribunals and codes, there remains confusion within both international and national courts as to 
which standard should apply.  This confusion reduces the level of predictability companies can 
rely on to make responsible business decisions.  For that reason, domestic and international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Id.  
76 Roy S. Lee, ed., The International Criminal Court; The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results 
(New York: UNITAR, 1999) 
77 Id. at 311 
78 Id. 
79 Kai Ambos, General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute, 10 CRIM. L.F. 1, 10 (1999). Professor Dr. 
Ambos is the Chair of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Comparative Law and International Criminal Law at the 
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen in Germany. 
80 Id. 
81 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (“A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense 
when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in 
conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is 
aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that 
8282 MODEL PENAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT AND EXPLANATORY NOTES 29-30, § 2.06 (1985) (as 
adopted at the 1962 Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE]. 
83 Art. 25(3)(c), ICC Statute. 
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legislatures and courts should clarify their mens rea standard by reviewing customary 
international law and its application in the development of the mens rea tests.  Customary 
international law requires only that an aider and abettor act with the mens rea element of 
knowledge.84  This rule has been recognized since the post-World War II military tribunals and 
endures in modern decisions of the international criminal tribunals, which were mandated 
specifically to apply customary international law.85  Analysis of Nuremberg-era jurisprudence 
confirms that knowledge was the standard applied, leading to both convictions and acquittals.86  
Additionally, the standard that emerged at Nuremberg has been consistently adopted in the 
intervening decades by international tribunals, including those for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda.87   
Furthermore, the Rome Statute does not supersede or restrict existing customary 
international law.88  It was drafted for a specific and unique court and resulted from a series of 
political compromises.89  Not every provision was intended to reflect customary international law 
and, accordingly, it expressly states that its provisions should not be read to limit international 
law.90  Additionally, for group crimes, the Rome Statute itself expressly provides a knowledge 
standard under article 25(3)(d).91 
In conclusion, despite the “purpose” test in the Rome Statute, domestic and international 
legislatures and courts should standardize their level of mens rea and find that customary 
international law, as reflected in the majority of the post-World War II case law, the case law of 
the ICTY and ICTR, the ILC Draft Code, and group crimes under article 25 (3) (d) of the ICC 
Statute, requires that those who aid and abet merely have knowledge that they are assisting 
criminal activity. 
 
III.  CONSEQUENCE OF VIOLATING HUMAN RIGHTS  
 
The impact for violating human rights can be damaging to a corporation.  Although 
thriving trade and business investments can help raise economies and individual standards of 
living, poor analysis of a business situation can alternatively injure both innocent civilians and 
the corporations involved.92   The following case, in which a company found themselves 
implicated in a human rights violation, demonstrates why business leaders should take action to 
prevent human rights violations not only as a moral duty, but also because it is sound business 
practice. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Brief by William Aceves as Amicus Curiae, p, 5 PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF SUDAN, ET AL. V. TALISMAN ENERGY, 
INC., No. 09-1262, (2010).   
85 Id. at 2 
86 See, e.g., Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 93, 
101 (1947) (Brit. Mil. Ct., Hamburg, Mar. 1-8, 1946) (convicting two industrialists who supplied poison gas to 
Nazis because they “knew” that it would be used to kill concentration camp prisoners); United States v. Von 
Weizsaecker (The Ministries Case), 14 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under 
Control Council Law No. 10 308, 478, 621- 22, 784, 854 (1949) (applying a mens rea of knowledge to all 
defendants but acquitting one whose actions did not meet the actus reus requirement). 
87 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1/T, Judgment, ¶ 236 (Dec. 10, 1998). 
88 William Aceves, supra note 84, at 3. 
89 Id.  
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 4 
92 Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability Vol. 1, supra note 11 at 1. 
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A. CASE STUDY: HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF SOUTHERN AFRICA’S EXTRACTIVE SECTOR 
 
In 2012, the South African Police shot to death 34 miners participating in a peaceful 
strike against Lonmin’s Marikana mine for violating their human rights in South Africa.93  Soon 
after, videos of the killings were broadcast worldwide of the tragedy that was dubbed the 
“Marikana Massacre.”94  What started as a nonviolent protest, resulted in a tragedy that left a 
crippling effect on the public, financial, and legal state of Lonmin.  The Chief Executive Officer 
of the company, Ben Magara, described the incident as “the week that changed our lives.”95  
Lonmin’s share price on the Jnternational Securities Exchange fell 50.3% in the year subsequent 
to the event, compared to one of their competitors in the mining and platinum industry, Anglo 
American Platinum (Amplats), which fell only 22.3%.96   Furthermore, Lonmin publically 
reported other financial difficulty.97  Lonmin lowered its expected spending in South Africa from 
R2.9 billion to R2.1 billion, and imposed a hiring freeze to review its operations in the country, 
preserve cash, and recover from the strike.98 
This event has compelled mining companies to acknowledge and confront how extractive 
operations can harm human rights and lead to extensive loss of life in extreme cases.99  
Furthermore, it has given the business community a leading example for understanding the effect 
of being implicated in a case where human rights have been violated.  
Mining is central to the economies of southern African countries.100  It accounts for 7% of 
the GDP in South Africa, 15% in Zimbabwe, and 24% in Zambia; it provides 390,000 jobs in 
South Africa and 60,000 in Zambia.101  But, there is so much more that this wealth-generating 
industry could be doing with the right policies, incentives, and regulation.102  Governments and 
companies can learn that it is in their interest to encourage industries to promote better policies 
and regulations in regards to human rights. 
A briefing focused on challenges to the mining industry to eradicate harm and abuse of 
human rights in its operations by the Business and Human Rights Centre found that mining 
companies in general suffer major financial losses from inadequate respect for human rights.103  
In the period leading up the Marikana massacre, from mid-2012 to April 2013, losses to the 
South African mining industry due to strikes amounted to R15 billion (US $1.3 billion).104  
Losses due to delays in mining projects, including those caused by companies failing to obtain 
consent from local communities, and being blocked by communities’ protests or legal claims, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Business unusual: Mining in the aftermath of Marikana The human rights impacts of southern Africa’s extractive 
sector, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre,  (February 2015). 
94 Daily Mail Reporter, South African Police are Filmed Shooting Dead 34 Miners… but Prosecutors Charge their 
270 Fellow Strikers with Murder under Tainted Apartheid-era Law, (August). 
95 Loni Prinsloo, ‘So You’ve Taken Billions, Lonmin? Give us just R1m’, Business Times, (Feb, 2015). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99  Business unusual, supra note 93. 
100 Id.  
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
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were projected at US $20 million per week on average for active, large mine projects.105  
Furthermore, potential payments to 17,000 former mine workers for silicosis claims in a lawsuit 
against mining companies totaled R1.5 billion (US $4.4. billion).106 
 
B. WHAT DO THESE NUMBERS TELL US? 
 
What this case exhibits is that it is not only right to respect human rights, but that it is 
also an advantageous business practice.107  Furthermore, it provides an example to demonstrate 
that  a genuine commitment to mainstream respect for human rights into all aspects of corporate 
governance and management can be beneficial to employees, supply chains, the broader 
community, and, ultimately, shareholders.108 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
It is in the best interest of businesses to understand, assess the risk, and implement a business 
model, which aims at preventing complicity in human rights violations.  In order for corporations 
to better design these plans and assess their legal responsibility, national and international courts 
need to unify their standards for crimes under international criminal law.  A genuine 
consideration of what it means to be complicit in human rights violations and how to prevent 
criminal liability can save corporations money, time, and public reputation.  Furthermore, a plan 
on how to avoid complicity in human right abuses can reduce a corporation’s legal liability.	  
 Even if corporations themselves cannot be prosecuted before international criminal 
tribunals, corporate executives and other individuals within the company can.  Additionally, 
corporations, especially those in the United States, face the risk of violating international law 
under their national judicial system.  As national criminal laws develop to include corporate 
liability, so do the arguments to extend the jurisdiction of international tribunals to include 
corporate entities. Companies, no matter where they operate, should be aware that their actions 
are subject to the limits set by international criminal law. 
International criminal law has long recognized criminal responsibility for aiding and 
abetting.  In order for businesses to better assess their legal responsibility and to clarify when 
private actors can be held criminally liable, legislatures and courts, at both the national and 
international level, should provide a standardized definition and application of the level of mens 
rea for aiding and abetting.  If the standards for aiding and abetting were clarified, the legal 
predictability would be fairer for both corporate managers and victims of human rights 
violations.  
It is not only right to protect human rights; it is also sound business practice.  Violating 
human rights can put a company at a disadvantage compared to its competitors because it can 
damage a company’s reputation, lose people jobs, and cost a corporation billions of dollars.  
Taking responsibility and creating a plan to prevent corporate complicity in human rights abuses 
is advantageous to compete in the developing global market.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Id. 
106 Business unusual, supra note 93. 
107 Id.  
108 Id.  
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